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Abstract 
 Lots of studies have been devoted to shipper’s modal choices since Baumol and 
Vinodt (1970) seminal papers. But, surprisingly, whereas institutional aspects play a 
determinant part in the structure of relationships in every supply chain, they are barely taken 
into account in academic papers (McGinnis, 1989; Jiang, 1998; Henscher and Puckett, 2005; 
Brooks et al., 2012), particularly regarding transaction costs. Indeed, shippers’ modal choices 
are often characterised by their inertia (Golicic et al, 2003), which cannot be explained 
without Transaction Costs Economics (or New Institutional Economics, see Ruester, 2010), as 
developed by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985; 1996) seminal works. This paper aims at 
showing that transaction costs are partially responsible for the low modal share of container 
barge transport in French maritime ports (9% of TEU in Le Havre and 5% in Marseille in 
2007). But instead of dealing with the transaction chain of container barging itself (Fischman 
and Lendjel, 2012), the paper focuses on shipper’s decision making process. The paper finds 
empirical evidence of those costs in ECHO’s survey (Guilbault et al., 2008), focusing on 
shipments involving barging legs in containerized maritime chains. The last section discusses 
those results. 
Keywords: pre- and end-haulage, shipper’s modal choice, transaction cost economics, 
container barge transport 
 
  




As is well known, the modal share of container barge transport (CBT) in French 
maritime ports (9% of TEU in Le Havre and 5% in Marseille in 2007) is significantly lower 
than elsewhere in Europe (32% in Rotterdam and 33% in Antwerp). Yet, recent research on 
maritime ports hinterlands (Notteboom 2004 ; Frémont et al. 2007; Konings 2007 ; Minvielle 
2007, Franc et Frémont 2008; Notteboom et Rodrigue 2009; Konings et al. 2010) points out 
the relevance of mass ground transport modes such as barge transport for enormous flows of 
containers to and from harbours, especially when a maritime port is located at the mouth of a 
river. 
 Some research and studies (Grégoire, 1983 ; Fischer et al., 2003 ; Cour des Comptes, 
2006; Frémont et Franc, 2008; ; Frémont et al., 2009; Blum, 2010; Revet, 2011) indicate that 
the viscosity of CBT flows in France arises from several factors, generally concentrated 
around the seaport community. The following may thus be noted:  
- The lack of maintenance and investment in infrastructures (Blum, 2010, pp. 61 and 
sq); 
- There are high transhipment costs in waterway transport compared to trucking 
(Fischer et al., 2003, Cour des Comptes, 2006).  
- The productivity levels of other assets of the CBT chain affect also its 
competitiveness and attractiveness. Moreover, barges are subjected to 
unproductive waiting time for quay access, or before handling operations start and, 
of course, during loading and unloading … (Beelen, 2011, p. 97).  
But few studies address the specific coordination problems affecting CBT in French seaports, 
despite their influence in shippers’ modal choices (Fremont, 2008). This paper aims at 
showing that transaction costs are partially responsible for this low modal share in France. 
But instead of dealing with the transaction chain of container barging itself (see e.g. Fischman 
and Lendjel, 2012), the paper focuses on shipper’s decision making process.  
 A specific extraction from the ECHOi national survey data base (realized by INRETS 
in 2004) was done for this inquiry into shipper’s role in inland shipping. Unfortunately, the 
very limited number of shipments involving barge transport that have been observed (70 over 
a total of 10 462 shipments in the survey, only 23 of which being containerized) in the survey 
does not permit their econometric treatment. Hence, the analysis of the data will be 
« qualitative », the proportions given - yet relevant – being not statistically representative.  
 Section 2 of the paper surveys the existing literature on shipper’s choices and shows 
the theoretical relevance of transaction costs economics in this respect, following Brooks et 
al. (2012). In particular, barging transport involves higher transaction costs for a shipper than 
road haulage. Section 3 finds empirical grounds of this relevance in Echo’s survey, focusing 
on shipments involving barging legs in containerized maritime chains. Section 4 discusses 
those findings.  
The literature and the relevance of transaction costs 
approach of shipper’s choice 
Literature 
 Lots of studies have been devoted to shipper’s modal choices since Baumol and 
Vinodt (1970) seminal papers. McGinnis (1989) survey of the literature numbered four 
different models of this phenomenon, besides numerous empirical articles: the classical 
economic model (Meyer et al., 1959), the inventory-theoretic model (Baumol and Vinodt, 
1970; Friedlaender and Spady, 1979; Sheffi et. al, 1981), the trade-off model (Roberts, 1970) 
taking into account non-transportation costs (i.e. organization costs), and he added a 
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“constrained optimization model” (McGinnis et al., 1981) quite close to the latter. At the end 
of his survey, McGinnis concluded that the great number of interacting variables involved in 
shipper’s choices is still puzzling for researchers and public policy makers. For example, 
recent articles have focused on the shipment size in the inventory-theoretic model in order to 
assess its influence on shippers’ logistics and transport costs (de Jong and Ben Akiva, 2007; 
Combes, 2011). A more recent survey of these models can be found in Hensher and Puckett 
(2005). 
 Surprisingly, whereas institutional aspects play a determinant part in the structure of 
relationships in every supply chain (Button, 2005), they are barely taken into account in 
academic papers. As stressed by Williamson (1985) on a theoretical dimension, any 
transaction is a ‘transfer across a technologically separable interface’ (Williamson, 1996, p. 
58) that takes place between two entities. If so, how could the transport transaction between a 
shipper and a carrier be exempt of transaction costs? Recently, Hensher and Puckett (2005) 
stated that commodity-based models and vehicule-trip-based models were mainly used 
without any reference to transaction costs effects on shipper’s modal choices (See also Brooks 
et al., 2012). As stressed by these authors, this could mislead the understanding of supply 
chains whose nature is based on interactions of interdependent agents and, thus, relies on 
transaction costs. Indeed, shippers’ modal choices are often characterised by their inertia 
(Golicic et al, 2003), or “structural inelasticity” (Rich et al., 2011). If the latter explained this 
inelasticity by the “lack of alternative freight networks from origin to destination” (idem), and 
connected it with the “last-mile” problem, this explanation doesn’t imply the inexistence of 
interconnections between networks for each couple of origin-destination. As stressed by Fogel 
(1962) in his assessment of the importance of railroad in the American economic growth, 
there is always alternative ways to achieve a transport. Interconnecting network inevitably 
increases the number of sub-transactions needed to achieve a transport. Raising this number 
involves an increase of transaction costs. Hence, trying to catch shipper’s choice leads to use 
transaction costs economics (or New Institutional Economics, see Ruester, 2010), as 
developed by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985; 1996). 
 Actually, this approach leads to change the usual lecture of shipper’s behaviour. 
Instead of transposing passenger travel choice models to freight transport (as Hensher and 
Puckett (2005) point out) by considering the shipper as a single and isolated agent choosing 
between abstract modes of transport (as depicted by Baumol and Vinodt (1970), for instance), 
this new literature tackles with collaborative process networks necessarily at stake when 
dealing with interactions between shippers and carriers in a given institutional environment 
(see Panayides, 2002; Golicic et al., 2003; Holmstrom et al., 2003; Rose and Hensher, 2004).  
 Mainly based on transaction costs economics (TCE), this new approach adopts a 
different body of assumptions on the economic behaviour of agents. Instead of dealing with 
perfect information and full rationality, agents have to deal with imperfect information, with 
limited cognitive skills to treat it, i.e. a “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1961). Agents may 
always be opportunistic (Williamson, 1975) in order to promote their self-interest or their 
strategic advantage with a limited understanding of their consequences. This opportunism can 
be passive (“lack of dedication in performing to the best of one’s competences”) or active 
(“lying, stealing and cheating to expropriate advantage from a partner”) (Woolthuis et al., 
2005). These assumptions lead to introduce a behavioural uncertainty (in addition to the 
uncertainty of the institutional environment) in any transaction. Taking into account the level 
of interdependence (asset specificity and frequency of the transaction) between parties for a 
given transaction leads to the analysis of the relevance of governance structure (market, 
hierarchy, hybrid) to minimize transaction costs. 
 As regard the shipper’s choice in this body of literature, whereas numerous papers deal 
with the opportunity to internalize the transport chain (see e. g. Baker and Hubbard (2003) 
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and Nickerson and Silverman (2003) about road haulage and Pirrong (1993) and Hall and 
Olivier (2005) about shipping), few of them tackle with the question of the modal choice. 
Though, as barge container transport is a different transaction from those of road or rail 
transport of container, they obviously involve different transaction costs, even in a given 
country. Transaction costs need thus to be taken into account in order to understand the 
shippers’ choices, as stressed by Panayidès: 
“the governance structure will depend upon three factors: the cost of production, the transaction costs, and 
the strategic costs and the benefits associated with the different governance structures” (Panayidès, 2002, 
p. 405).  
 Focusing on container transport, this paper assumed that the shipper has no interest to 
internalize this transaction. A container is designed to be used recurrently to carry quite any 
kind of cargo that can be unitized. Thanks to its standardisation, its very advantage lies in the 
increase of the frequency of transaction due to the diversification of clients. Container 
standardisation lowering transaction costs promotes the positive effects of the market 
governance structure, i.e. scale and scope economies due to the aggregation of diverse 
demands (Williamson 1985, p. 92; 1996, p. 66). Hence, container transport is a transaction 
that should not be internalized by any shipper (Fischman and Lendjel, 2012). Indeed, the unit 
cost of container transport will be less for a shipper if the fixed costs of the transport are 
shared between several shippers. Thus, whatever the frequency of transactions is, no shipper 
is encouraged to internalize container barge transport owed to administration costs it 
generates and the loss of scale and scope economies reached by the market. 
 Assuming that the governance structure of this transaction is not hierarchical, ex-ante 
and ex-post transaction costs are to be listed according to the mode of transport used, before 
focusing on container barge transport. These costs of search, writing and enforcing contracts 
differ according several factors.  
Ex-ante costs 
 Ex-ante costs are related to the search of potential trading partners, their freight rate, 
time spent negotiating and writing contracts. In the transport sector, those costs are more 
important than in other sectors.  
Search costs 
 Search is inherent to the nature of the service of transport for dispersed assets (vehicles 
and drivers) are needed at any given moment and place. As Baker and Hubbard stressed it 
about road haulage,  
“[t]he demand for trucking services and the supply of truck capacity are highly differentiated. Shippers' 
demands are specific with respect to time, location, and equipment requirements. Likewise, truck capacity 
is idiosyncratic with respect to its geographic location and the characteristics of the trailer” (Baker and 
Hubbard, 2003, p. 554).  
The “load matching problem” involves high ex-ante costs, even within regular services, such 
as container transport. Structural imbalance of flows adds imperfect organization to the 
sequence of trips due to the importance of these costs. In those decentralized markets (i.e., 
each transport can be considered as a specific sub-market), information costs are high and 
explain the prominent role of third-party brokers who are reaching scale economies in search 
processes. Their importance may hence be approximated by their fees, but is likely to differ 
according to transport modes. Indeed, taking into account that this sub-transaction may be 
internalized by transport operators, its importance relies on the number of potential operators 
in the search for a specific match: the lower their number, the cheaper the search costs. In 
France, the number of operators is estimated at 800 in inland water transport, 19 in rail freight 
transport, 37 500 in road haulage and 3 800 in freight forwarding (CCTN, 2012). Thanks to 
information technologies (IT), freight forwarders’ networks and reputation assets, the time 
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spent for matching is significantly shortenedii. But it still remains significant enough to justify 
the need for a third party such as freight forwarders.  
 Search time is also shortened if the shipment is sent on a regular basis, within a global 
contract framework with a partner. Scale economies occur here as anywhere and explain the 
existence of freight forwarders.  
 One may suppose that the number of stakeholders involved in a transport adds to the 
length of the search process. A container carried by barge, for instance, needs usually a pre- 
or post-haulage. The search process by a shipper or a freight forwarder depends on the level 
of integration of the transport chain. As detailed in section 3, container barge transport chains 
are more complex than the others. A specific extraction from the ECHO national survey 
database (realized by INRETS in 2004) shows that 100% of the 23 container barge transport 
shipments found in the survey (from a total of 10 462 shipments involved in the survey) were 
outsourced and involved at least three operators. Hence, the container barge transport belongs 
to a larger chain usually more complex to organize than the other transport chains, as only 7% 
of the shipments – parcels excluded – involve at least three operators (Guilbault et al. 2008, p. 
108 ; Bréhier and Gavaud 2009, p. 8). 
------------ 
Insert Figure 1 
------------ 
 Finally, the search costs of relevant information probably vary according to the market 
situation. For example, the economic crisis of 2008-2009 has probably had the effect of 
increasing search costs for barge operators. Conversely, a strong growth with a positive net 
demand would probably increase shippers search costs. For instance, availability of a 
container and a truck depends also of the actual net demand at a given moment for this 
specific service. The relationship between search costs and the net demand of transport could 
be approximated by a logistics curve (Fig. 1). As such, competition can be considered as a 
negative externality for shippers when the net demand for transport is positive and conversely. 
Indeed, the time loss incurred by a shipper in searching increases with the importance of 
positive net demand of transport. 
Negotiation and contracting 
 Costs of negotiation and writing contracts are probably lower in France than 
elsewhere. Since 1986, “standard contracts” (“contrats types” in French) prevail in road 
haulage and river transport. Orientation Law Inland Transport (LOTI) of 30 December 1982 
has indeed enacted a set of contrats types, enforced in 1986 by a decree, designed for land 
transport. Regulatory, a contrat type is however supplementary (“supplétif”), that is to say its 
clauses apply as of right in the absence of any explicit written contract between the parties. 
The contrat type avoids to redefine and renegotiate fairly standard clauses of transportation 
contracts. It leaves at the same time freedom of contract between the parties and preserves the 
consensual nature of the commercial contract. Economists have studied little those contracts, 
despite the fact that this French specificity is quite envied abroad. Fischman and Lendjel 
(2011) show that, as any contract, it’s used to economize transaction costs in order to preserve 
the advantages of the market governance structure.  
 A contrat type can be defined by four criteria. It is 
1. a coordination mechanism between the parties (Brousseau et Glachant, 2000); 
2. an arrangement of the transaction negotiated and defined in advance by all the actors - 
or their representatives –; 
3. a device to define a standard for a given transaction for all actors in a given territory; 
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4. a device with a "residual" character, which therefore requires parties in a transaction in 
the absence of express written contract. As such, it is necessarily driven and enforced 
by government. 
Supplementary in nature, contrats types allow agents with a bounded rationality to avoid to 
redefine the “best” (or conventional) clauses of a contract and thus save its drafting costs. 
Available for any mode of transport, those contracts dwindle contracting costs which have no 
reason to differ according to the modes of transport. 
 But the level of negotiation could be different. From a neo-institutionalism point of 
view, asymmetry of market power does not come from the number of competitors, but from 
transaction costs related to the size of parties. The ECHO survey shows that here is a 
behavioral asymmetry between large (over 500 employees) and small (fewer than 20 
employees) shippers (Bréhier et al., 2009, p. 24). Basically, small shippers seek out large 
carriers, mainly because of their reputation assets (the "big names") owned precisely to attract 
customers wishing to minimize their search costs. Conversely, large shippers seek out small 
and medium carriers (less than 100 employees), as the volume and frequency of transactions 
at stake are almost vital for them, often because of investments they dedicate accordingly. The 
asymmetric size and the induced dependency pave the way to possible opportunistic behavior. 
Pre-adaptation to the transaction 
 Finally, ex-ante costs include also organizational settings necessary to prepare a 
transaction. On that respect, modes of transport are not equal for a shipper. The matching 
problem explains probably why the waiting time (or so-called “pre-advise” time) to deliver a 
container to the sender’s warehouse for an outbound trip is longer for a barge than for a truck. 
This was indeed a curious difference observed in CMA-CGM’s door-to-door service in March 
2011. The pre-advise time to position (always by truck) a container at sender’s place (in 
France) is four days for a barge, instead of two days for a full-truck trip to Le Havre or 
Marseille/Fos-sur-mer. This pre-advise time even reaches eight days (instead of three if it’s a 
full-truck trip) if the destination is Rotterdam. And curiously, even if those waiting times are 
twice longer than the commercial lead-time to carry a container to a given port, they are 
usually not taken into account in most of shipper’s modal choice models (see for instance, 
Brooks et al., 2012). Knowing that only four barge operators (and six services) are available 
on the Seine River (Fischman and Lendjel, 2012), those conditions specific to CMA-CGM’s 
subsidiary dedicated to combined transport – Greenmodal (formerly RSC) – are probably 
similar for the other operators.  
 Another example can be found in rail freight sector. Fret SNCF, the main French rail 
operator, asks its customers to fellow a cumbersome procedure to use their new isolated 
wagon offer (MLMC). 
“Customers estimate the wagons needed a year ahead, adjust the number two months and one month in 
advance, and then divide up the shipments day by day one week before transport. If less than 90% of the 
ordered wagons are used, the retractions are billed, and below 80% there is a surcharge. A bonus is applied, 
however, if revenues exceed the contract amount”.
iii
 
This procedure is logic for the freight operator, but disregard the broad diffusion of lean 
production and just-in-time among shippers, where buffer stocks tend to diminish, shipments 
tend to be fragmented and to increase in number (Guilbault et al., 2008). As pointed out by 
the supply chain manager of a chemical company in an interview, this procedure leads to an 
increase of organizational costs. First, it leads to involve more the recipient in the planning 
process of delivery by asking them to plan their needs for 2 months. Second, Fret Sncf has 
transferred to its clients the task to predict their flows and to feed its online interface with 
those planned flows. Meanwhile, the shipper could is still ask for a couple of wagons in 
addition to a planned command, but this remains subject to acceptance by Fret SNCF. There 
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is no guarantee either as regard the delivery time in this case. Conversely, it is not possible to 
cancel wagons without important penalty. The rigidity of the supply is part of ex-ante 
transaction costs supported by a shipper when using railway for its shipments. 
 This entails organizational consequences for shippers’ modal choices, especially in 
their planning process, their warehouse management, etc. A shipper does not bear the same 
organizational costs with trucking as with barging.  
Ex-post costs 
 Ex-post costs come from maladaptation, monitoring, renegotiation and breach of 
contract. The contract creates a bilateral dependency – a “lock-in” - between the parties that 
needs to be managed and enforced through monitoring mechanisms. As stressed by 
Williamson, there is a “fundamental transformation” from an ex-ante competition where the 
identity of the parties does not matter to the ex-post bilateral dependency where their identity 
is of prominent importance. In the case of container transport, one could expect a weak 
dependency between the shipper and the carrier because of the standard character of the 
involved assets. But, as stressed Pirrong following Masten, Meehan and Snyder (1991),  
“time and space factors in shipping markets may create "temporal specificities" that encourage costly haggling 
between shippers and carriers over quasi rents if they rely on spot contracts” (Pirrong, 1993, p. 937). 
This prevails also for ground pre/post-routing in container transport. The value of goods 
carried by container declines with the transit time; and any barge positioned to meet a given 
located demand incurs loss of time and money for this purpose and could miss a better 
opportunity. This mutual dependency gives rise to temporal specificity (idem.). According to 
Pirrong (ibid., p. 945), temporal specificity is insubstantial in case of spot contract. But the 
time sensibility of the shipper usually leads him to choose road haulage instead of barge 
transport to save two days in the global transit time. And Pirrong’s paper only tackles with 
bulk shipping and not with container shipping lines.  
 As is well known, many ex-post problems could arise: 
• unexpected delay of the arrival date of the container at the shipper’s warehouse; 
• unexpected delay of the pick-up date of the container at the shipper’s warehouse; 
• damaged container or, more important, damaged cargo at consignee’s warehouse; 
knowing the probability of a damage relies on the number of transshipments, 
multimodal transport incurs a higher risk of damage than full-truck trip to/from the 
port.  
• Unsuitable container in any of its characteristics; 
• container missing the planned ship;  
• container sent by error to another destination;  
• loss of the container; 
• time to pick up a container in a maritime container terminal and associated demurrage 
costs;  
• security costs 
• Etc. 
But, regarding shippers’ modal choices, only predictable ex-post costs are here to be taken 
into account. Hence, unexpected maladaptation, renegotiation and breach of contract are a 
priori out of the scope of this study. Among remaining ex-post costs, monitoring and 
incentive are the most important aspects to tackle with. 
 Monitoring and incentive are important when it comes to respecting delivery 
commitment. For instance, unexpected delays are frequent in railway in France due to the 
priority granted to passenger trains. According to Réseau Ferré de France (RFF, the French 
provider of rail access), 70.1% of freight trains arrived on time in 2011iv. Fret SNCF recently 
introduced a new clause in his isolated wagon offer that warrants delivery times (80% on time 
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and 90% on day +1) and reliability (accompanied by financial compensation in case of 
delay)v. As stressed by Brooks et al. (2012), the reliability matters in shippers’ choices and 
could explain part of the low modal share of railway in ground transport of goods. Note that, 
in that respect, inland waterway transport is often considered as the most reliable mode of 
transport, even compared to road haulage. But regarding security and safety, railway is 
considered as a reliable mode of transportvi, and in any case, more reliable than road haulage. 
Hence, monitoring costs are similar for a shipper whatever the mode of transport, but not the 
probability of unexpected delays.  
 Ex-post costs in transport have been studied in shipping (Pirrong, 1993), road haulage 
(Nickerson and Silverman, 2003; Allam and Lendjel, 2007), rail transport (Yvrande-Billon 
and Ménard, 2005) and inland waterway transport (Fischman and Lendjel, 2012).  
 Theoretically, ex ante and ex post costs affect significantly shippers’ modal choices. 
Evidence on transaction costs in barging for shippers 
 Empirical grounds of the importance of transaction costs in shippers’ choices can be 
found in a specific extraction from the ECHO national survey data base (realized by INRETS 
in 2004; see Guilbault et al., 2008) which was done for this inquiry. The purpose here is to 
focus only on barge transport. 70 shipments involving barge transport have been observed in 
the survey (70 over a total of 10 462 shipments in the survey), only 25 of which were 
containerized, 13 with twenty-foot containers and 12 with forty feet containers. Due to the 
huge gap with shipments sent by road (78.2% of the total of shipments), container barge 
shipments (0.7%) need to be isolated for the sake of their analysis, even if they cannot be 
statistically representative. Those 25 shipments are all maritime outbound chains (100%), 
with a river leg in their pre-haulage transports and, mainly (64%), a terminal road haulage.  
Relevant variables 
 Several questions were included in the four questionnaires (the pre-questionnaire of 
the establishment (PQ), the establishment questionnaire (EQ), the shipment questionnaire 
(SQ), the path questionnaire (PaQ)) cope with determinants of shipper’s choices. Some of 
them were designed to catch transaction costs. Following Williamson 1996, a transaction can 
be characterized in three dimensions by its attributes: asset specificity (i.e., level of loss 
associated to alternate use of assets involved in the transaction, or re-deployability’s level of 
the asset), frequency (number of times a transaction occur in a given period), uncertainty 
(related to the environment of the transaction and to the behaviour of parties in condition of 
bilateral dependency). Those attributes determine ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs 
incurred in a given transaction.  
 As regard asset specificity, several variables in ECHO’s survey can be listed. 
Williamson (1996, p. 59) identifies six kinds of asset specificity: site specificity, physical 
asset specificity, human asset specificity, dedicated asset, reputation asset, temporal 
specificity.  
• Site specificity: the presence of dedicated to or owned assets by the shipper in the 
chosen port (SQ, 30a); geographical proximity of the chosen port (idem.); availability 
of a parking to load/unload goods in/from a truck (EQ, e33); operational connected 
rail tracks at shipper’s warehouse (EQ, e35a); access to an operational waterway dock 
at shipper’s warehouse (idem.); access to an operational maritime dock at the shipper’s 
warehouse (ibid.); 
• Physical asset specificity: means of communication used (SQ, q4a) and possessed 
(EQ, e26a); transport specific requirements for the shipment (SQ, q12); the possession 
of specialized assets by the carrier (SQ, q28);  
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• Human asset specificity: the level of qualification of the labour force (but this question 
cannot really assess the existence of human asset specificity in the specific transaction 
at stake) (EQ, e7); 
• Dedicated assets: shipper’s possession of its own fleet (PQ, p15) or managing a 
dedicated fleet (EQ, e38; SQ, q20); the prior provision of equipment (SQ, q28) 
• Reputation asset: the number of employees (PQ, Effetcen); recourse to a third party 
(freight forwarder) (SQ, q24; q25); criterion of choice of the mode of transport used 
(SQ, qt28);  
• Temporal specificity; the prior availability of required material (SQ, q28); maximum 
delivery time agreed (SQ, q9); the shipper’s internal delay of treatment of the order 
(SQ, q10); reliability of delay (SQ, q28); number of days of production corresponding 
to the stock outgoing products (EQ, e14) 
A question about the reason of the non-choice of the alternative mode of transport could 
unveil the constrained dimension of the choice operated by the shipper. “What are the main 
failed criteria that explain you did not accept this alternative or that you have considered that 
there was no other way possible?” (SQ, qt30) 
 As regard frequency, the number of shipments occurring in a year (SQ, q6) and their 
tonnage (SQ, q7) are specified in the shipment questionnaire.  
 Uncertainty is a more difficult dimension to assess through the ECHO’s survey, 
especially due to the importance of behavioral uncertainty that has to be distinguished from 
the environmental uncertainty. The use of tracking system (SQ, q4a; EQ, e26a) may 
approximate monitoring costs to diminish the behavioral uncertainty. The number of 
intermediaries has also to be taken into consideration (quantity of establishments – and thus of 
questionnaires - involved for a given shipment). Finally, waiting time to connect two modes 
of transport (mainly in ports) may introduce uncertainty in time delivery to market (PaQ, t1 et 
t6). 
 Those variables are to be confronted with governance structures used (EQ, e28; SQ, 
q23). Here, focusing on the few barge transport shipments, the paper tackle with actual barge 
container transport chains chosen by shippers in 2004. That means that transaction costs were 
sufficiently low to let the shipper buy the cheapest mode of transport.  
Results 
 Before assessing transaction costs, one should characterize goods and the shipments at 
stake. Few goods have constrained the choice of shippers by their characteristics. Only one 
container carried a dangerous good and one was considered as fragile. None of them needed 
specific characteristics such as reefer container or other kind. This means that only 2 
shipments (8%) were considered as deserving a special treatment. This result is coherent with 
the governance structure chosen (market) by shippers here and the use of containerized 
transport. Several results help to characterize the transaction attributes and transaction costs. 
Transit time, waiting time and temporal specificity 
 Almost all these shipments were transported on the Rhine River, only one on the Seine 
River and five on the Rhône River. The total distance is, for every shipment, greater than 
1000 km with a shipping leg. The river trip is on average 6.3% of the total distance (and less 
than 10% in more than three trips in four). Similarly, travel time on river is on average 11% of 
the total transit time, a duration less than twice the average waiting time at the port (23% of 
total transit time). The survey does not mention the time between order and delivery of the 
service (for example, the time required to position the container at the shipper’s warehouse). 
Hence, with an average of 30 days, the transit time factor does not seem to be in itself an 
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obstacle to the use of river transport in the shipment of containers. But waiting time is a more 
probable factor that gives rise to uncertainty of the delivery time.  
 Time also matters in shippers’ internal procedure of ordering or booking a shipment 
(SQ, Q10). Huge differences appear for shipments involving a container barge transport: from 
4 hours to a maximum of 120 days (and an average of 57.6 days)!! Even if those results are 
not statistically representative, organizational costs can thus be very important for a shipper. 
The same gap exists for the maximal delivery time (with an average of 43.6 days)… 
 But curiously, when asking shippers about their main criteria for a shipment, time 
seems less important than expected. The main criterion for shippers was, of course, the “cost 
of transport”, far beyond (60%) the other criteria. But interestingly, the time factor (“transport 
transit time”), usually considered as the second main factor, was relevant for 5 shipments only 
(20%), as the “reliability of delays” or the “frequency of departures” (8%). Likewise, the 
“flexibility” is only important for 3 shipments. Other items such as “the possession of 
specialized assets by the carrier” or “the prior availability of a required material”, indicator of 
asset specificity, were not quoted by shippers using container barge transport.  
Site specificity 
 When a shipper specifies his choice of a given maritime port, his first two criteria are 
its proximity (33%) and the frequency of arrival/departures of shipping lines to the desired 
destination (33%). The last criterion means that a port will be chosen due to its network 
effects (number of interconnections provided). Both criteria unveil the existence of site 
specificity for 66% of shipments involving a barge transport leg. The latter requires first a 
maritime port connected to a river and second a high frequency. This means primarily that 
barging cannot be chosen by a shipper without taking into consideration the whole chain 
involved. But the second criterion related to the frequency of departures of shipping lines 
reveals also time sensitivity for 33% of those shipments. Hence, any delay occurring during 
the barging leg can be managed/fixed through the help of a high frequency of departure of 
shipping lines. As already stressed by Pirrong (1993), the availability of a ship for a shipper 
depends on its location. The lock-in situation will be stronger if the ship has to be positioned 
in the middle of nowhere instead of in a big port where opportunities are multiple. Site 
specificity is closely related to temporal specificity.  
 As regard river port, five shippers (20% of the shipments) do possess private river 
docks that enforce their choice of river transport. These shippers are cereal collection 
companies that send (generally abroad) grains, malt, cornmeal and are usual users of barge 
transport. Using a container barge transport entails minimal transaction costs for them: they 
already know all operators and frequently charter them. They own silos, handling equipment 
and sometimes their own barges. The same transactional characteristics are met in the cement 
industry, the other big user of barge transport. Cement has a twofold distinction of being 
bulky and taking prompt. The first feature involves large volumes of transportation of raw 
components of concrete (sand, clinker,..) and of rubble removal. Most major cement 
companies (Calcia-Italcementi, Cemex, Holcim, Lafarge ...) have established their concrete 
plants on river banks (and / or railway sidings) to minimize their transportation costs. Regular 
needs for concrete production entail long-term contracts (or concessions) for the long-term 
use of riverbanks. It is the same for concrete plants and their handling equipment. Second, 
short drying time implies a very short period of use of the concrete produced in a plant 
(Eccles, 1981). This constraint introduces a high degree of temporal specificity in the 
transport chain of concrete (Masten et al., 1991). It implies to have concrete plants installed 
near city centers in order to have a longer use of concrete. The temporal specificity justifies 
the establishment of plants in the heart of cities, and feeds back the site specificity (close to 
the point of delivery of raw materials to the concrete plant) of river docks. 
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 Those shippers cannot be representative, but help to understand that transaction costs 
associated with container barge transport are significantly lower for them than for others, 
because they are already big users of inland waterway transport. Sending a container by barge 
is a peripheral transaction for them, distinct from their usual shipments by barge. As those 
shippers are using quite all modes of transport, it is easy for them to compare freight rates. 
But, in this small world, good relationships with bargemen are essential for the smooth run of 
shippers’ transport chains. Hence, ex-ante and ex-post costs are reduced. 
 When a shipper is not located in the vicinity of a river, the site specificity of the inland 
port vanishes progressively. The majority (two-thirds of shipments) of container barge 
transports involves a pre-haulage by road. In this case, road distance to port is mostly short: 
72% of pre-haulage by road are less than 50 kilometers (and all the more small compared to 
the average distance of total transport of 6 840km of the sample). Only 4 shipments (16%) 
were concerned by the impact of the conditions of land access in the choice of the port. As 
regard container barge transport, the choice of a port is not related to the presence or existence 
of specific equipment and industrial arrangement. This aspect was important for only 2 
shipments (8%). Likewise, there is no dedicated relationship with the freight forwarder and/or 
the logistics provider located in the port that could influence the choice of the port. 
 All these results mean that barge transport is very dependent to the presence of an 
inland port in the vicinity (less of 50 km) of the shipper. Those aspects clearly impede any 
development of barging transport for a shipper, as confirmed in an interview of Mr. S. Faure, 
in charge of Oxylane’s east-European supply chainvii. 
Governance structure 
 The contractual conditions of the shipments depicted in the survey help to characterize 
their governance structures and their associated costs.  
 First, the shipper is usually (78%) the principal of the container barge transport chain, 
but not systematically. The recipient organizes 17.4% of the shipments and sometimes co-
organizes it with the shipper (4.3%).  
 Second, the shipment is isolated in general (96%) from the other shipments sent by a 
shipper. But half (52%) of those single-purpose shipments have been sent in a preset program 
of orders with the buyer. Those shipments have a regularity that creates a mutual dependency 
between the consignor and the consignee. This seems to be a characteristic of inland 
waterway transport. Guilbault et al. (2008, p. 167) has stressed that 76% of all shipments by 
barge (70 shipments) are sent in the frame of a preset program of orders. But, this means also 
that a container is less frequently sent in a preset program of orders than the other shipments 
by barge. A comparison with shipments sent by other modes of transport shows a lower share 
of preset program of orders (43%) than for container barge transports (52%).   
 Third, the organization of the transport chain of the shipment is sometimes (40%) 
internalized by the shipper, but mainly achieved by a third party (60%). The merchant haulage 
is the dominant way of organizing those chains, but the carrier haulage concerned one quarter 
of the shipments. As stated earlier, barge container transport chains are complex chains that 
involve at least 3 “participants” (“intervenants”, i.e. operators) besides the shipper. The 
ECHO survey identifies several configurations of subcontracting chains (Guilbault et al., 
2008). Their comparison with container barge transport chains in the table 1 helps to point out 
the singularity of these chains for a shipper. In ECHO survey, only 6.75% of the whole 
shipments were involving more than 2 operators, whereas it is the case in 100% of 
containerized shipments by barge. Actually, 69.6% of those shipments involved 3 or more 
operators (instead of 2) with multiple subcontracting. Moreover, on average, 5.8 operators 
(recipient excluded) are involved in a shipment with a container barging leg, with a maximum 
of 11 operators in one case! The average distance of the total transport plays probably its part 
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in the singularity of container barging chains, involving a larger network of operators than 
usually needed for local or national transports. As the quality of information decreases with 
the distance (estimated either in kilometer and/or in number of operators), ex-ante and ex-post 
costs should increase accordingly. The multiplicity of operators and of subcontracting can’t 
but give higher transaction costs than in other chains. A shipment through barging implies at 
least 3 contracts that have to be dealt between the shipper and the operators, instead of one in 
road haulage, even though, the remuneration of the forwarder (“honoraire” or “fee”) was 
mainly considered as unimportant by shippers (72%). 
 According to Guilbault et al. (2008), a typology of those chains can be drawn. In those 
complex chains, one (or more) leading operator - directly mandated by the shipper or the 
recipient - entrusts part or all of the operations he is in charge to one or more operators. The 
transaction of container transport, as understood as a transfer of a service “across a 
technologically separable interface” (Williamson 1996, p. 58), is subdivided in several sub-
transactions. Each sub-transaction includes an organizational part and a performing part, each 
of them being subcontracted or not. Subcontracting is understood here broadly as a sequence 
of mandates for the same service between operators (Guilbault et al. 2008, p. 107). It includes 
a sequence between a broker or a freight forwarder (searching and organizing) and a carrier 
(performing the transport) or between 2 carriers (subcontracting stricto sensu, where the 
leading carrier organizes the transport and ask the subcontractor to perform all or part of the 
transport).  
Insert Table 1 
Class 5 of Guilbault’s typology is characterized by simple outsourcing relationships (where 
each one does not mandate more than one operator) between operators. Those “linear 
subcontracting chains” represent up 3% of the whole shipments of ECHO survey, instead of 
30% in container barge transport chains (see Table 1). Class 6 includes relations of 
subcontracting named “in arborescence” where at least one operator (the leading one 
mandated by the shipper) appoints several other operators to perform all or part of the 
transport operations. Those chains are dominant in container barging (70%) whereas they 
represent only 4% of the whole shipments of the ECHO Survey. Those contractual chains are 
also frequently used in maritime chains where they represent up 21% of the shipments. On a 
contractual plan, the high number of stakeholders entails a chain of liability that is difficult to 
identify in case of claim. Ex-posts costs (monitoring, claims, delays, etc.) are likely to be 
greater than in simpler chains such as with road haulage. This may also explain the reluctance 
of French shippers to use container barge transport chains for their shipments.  
Concluding remarks 
 Transaction costs matters when coming to choose between alternate modes of 
transport for a shipper. This neglected dimension may explain the difficulties met by usual 
models to fully assess and predict shippers’ choices. Container barge transport is significantly 
affected by those costs as shown in the specific extraction of the ECHO survey done for this 
inquiry. Evidently, this sector has significantly improved its supply since 2004, year of the 
survey. And the rapid growth of this small segment of barge transport may invalidate those 
conclusions. It stresses the need for a new ECHO survey to complete the surveys of 1988 and 
2004.  
 Maritime operators are impacted by those costs, when it comes to dealing with the 
growth of container traffic in congested ports. The level of integration of the container 
barging chain is a possible answer (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2009). Indeed, the number of 
operators involved in a barging chain can’t but raise ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs. 
And contrary to maritime transport which is the dominant mode of transport for a shipper 
wishing to send goods abroad, barge transport is the smallest mode of transport in France.  
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Those transactional barriers should be recognized by the government, especially if it wants to 
encourage the development of sustainable transport chains such as barging. 
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Table 1: contractual configuration of 
transport chains (based on Guilbault et al., 






















































































                                                 
i
 ECHO (“Envois - CHargeurs - Opérateurs de transport”) is a national survey designed to understand shipper’s 
practices and whose measurement unit is the shipment sent by a shipper. For a summary of the ECHO 
survey’s results, see Guilbault et al., 2008. The very few observed shipments (70) involving a barge 
transport in the survey do not permit a quantitative analysis. Hence, our analysis of the data is « qualitative 
» and the proportions given cannot be statistically representative in the insight of the small sample size. 
Yet, they are not irrelevant. 
ii
 Baker and Hubbard (2003) have already assessed the effects of IT on the size of firms in trucking. 
iii
 http://fret.sncf.com/fret/lang-fr/. Last check: 25/02/2013 
iv
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25/02/2013. 
v
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 Interview realized in Paris, December the 19
th
 of 2012. 
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